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Neighborhood Conservation Districts 
THE NEW BELT AND SUSPENDERS 
OF MUNICIPAL ZONING 
William A. Fischel† 
INTRODUCTION 
In a comment about ten years ago, I argued that private 
land use regulation was a complement to rather than a 
substitute for public regulation.1 By this I meant that private 
regulations should work hand-in-hand with public regulations, 
rather than as alternatives to one another. Robert H. Nelson 
had suggested that the rapid growth of homeowner associations 
since 1970 would displace zoning and related public land use 
controls at the municipal level.2 His hope was that such 
displacement would free developers from the shackles of 
municipal regulation, which he—and I—expected to cause 
inefficiently low densities of homes and businesses.3 
One of the problems with Nelson’s plan was the difficulty 
of establishing private community associations in already-
developed areas. Once an area is built up, neighbors are unlikely 
to agree to the covenants and related restrictions to establish a 
system of private governance.4 This is why nearly all examples of 
successful homeowner associations are those that are initially 
set up by a developer, who then sells the lots to buyers who have 
no choice but to accept the covenants and governance structure.  
  
 † Professor of Economics and Hardy Professor of Legal Studies, Dartmouth College. 
 1 William A. Fischel, The Rise of Private Neighborhood Associations: 
Revolution or Evolution?, in THE PROPERTY TAX, LAND USE AND LAND-USE REGULATION 
273 (Dick Netzer ed., 2003).  
 2 Robert H. Nelson, The Rise of Private Neighborhood Associations: A 
Constitutional Revolution in Local Government, in THE PROPERTY TAX, LAND USE AND 
LAND-USE REGULATION, supra note 1, at 256. 
 3 William A. Fischel, Does the American Way of Zoning Cause the Suburbs of 
Metropolitan Areas to Be Too Spread Out?, in GOVERNANCE AND OPPORTUNITY IN 
METROPOLITAN AREAS 151 (Alan Altshuler et al. eds., 1999). 
 4 Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace 
Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (1999).  
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It now appears that this problem has been overcome by 
“neighborhood conservation districts,” which are in many ways 
similar to private regulations but do not require the consent of all 
property owners in the neighborhood. However, these new 
institutions have not become vehicles to facilitate neighborhood 
change, as Nelson had hoped. They are instead quite 
conservative—as their name implies—and are used to discourage 
redevelopment that is inconsistent with existing patterns. The 
quasi-privatization of land use in this case has been a vehicle to 
ramp up regulation, not release the energies of developers.  
Beyond describing the major characteristics of the new 
conservation districts, I will speculate on why homeowners 
have increased the demand for regulation beyond what is 
provided by more traditional zoning mechanisms. Fragmentary 
evidence suggests that the main reasons have been growth in 
the value of housing and attempts by higher governments and 
the courts to interfere—as most communities view them—in 
the regulatory affairs of municipalities. In short, additional 
local regulation may be a response to attempts to shoehorn 
affordable housing, cell-phone towers, and group homes into 
existing neighborhoods.  
I. MUNICIPAL POLITICS AND ZONING 
Because the occasion for this essay was a conference 
held at Brooklyn Law School in the City of New York, I need to 
explain why zoning in much of the rest of the nation might be 
different than in its largest municipality. The simplest and 
most widely used model of local political behavior is the one we 
learned in high-school civics: the majority of voters get their 
way. Economists and many political scientists have adopted 
this model and bent it to their purposes in analyzing public 
decisions. Known as the median voter model, it supposes that 
preferences for local public issues like zoning can be ranked on 
a scale of “least preferred” to “most preferred,” and that the 
voters in the middle of the scale—the median voter—prevail on 
every issue.5 Thus, the voters who rank zoning on the middle of 
the scale—say, with some restrictions, but none so detailed as to 
forestall all development options—will get the zoning they want.  
Studies of the relationship between municipal-service 
levels and the characteristics of local voters support the median 
  
 5 See generally Randall G. Holcombe, The Median Voter Model in Public 
Choice Theory, 61 PUB. CHOICE 115 (1989).  
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voter model, especially for cities and towns.6 But it is somewhat 
less successful at the state and national level, and for larger 
cities and counties, because of the problems of rational 
ignorance (caused by the knowledge that one’s vote has a very 
low chance of affecting the outcome of an election), the size and 
complexity of government, and the possibility that a 
heterogeneous electorate may have conflicting demands for 
government services and the taxes that pay for them. In these 
contexts, interest groups that speak for various constituencies, 
especially those who more directly profit from government 
activities, step in to displace the voters.7  
The upshot of this model of politics is that land use 
regulation in the suburbs and small cities and towns is very 
likely to match the preferences of local residents. In other work 
I have claimed that the local voters who are both most 
numerous and most acutely interested in zoning issues are 
homeowners.8 These “homevoters”9 shape zoning to serve their 
interests in the suburbs and smaller cities. But zoning in the 
suburbs is also shaped by the fact that the municipalities are 
usually numerous, meaning that potential residents can “vote 
with their feet” and reject jurisdictions whose rules do not 
comport with their demands. This tends to homogenize voter 
preferences within communities and reinforces the median 
voter model, because those who have differing preferences from 
the majority will opt for other locations.10  
The foregoing view of local politics implies that 
residents of smaller cities and suburbs ought to be more 
satisfied with their local zoning than residents of larger cities 
and counties. City residents have to tussle with development-
minded interest groups within city politics, while suburban 
residents can make developers dance to the music of existing 
homeowners.11 Tiebout-style migration—whereby households 
“vote with their feet” for their preferred public services—
  
 6 Geoffrey K. Turnbull & Peter M. Mitias, The Median Voter Model Across 
Levels of Government, 99 PUB. CHOICE 119, 136 (1999). 
 7 Heather Rose & Jon Sonstelie, School Board Politics, School District Size, 
and the Bargaining Power of Teachers’ Unions, 67 J. URB. ECON. 438, 472-73 (2010). 
 8 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES 
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE 
POLICIES 1, 4 (2001). 
 9 Id. at 1. 
 10 Fernando Ferreira & Joseph Gyourko, Do Political Parties Matter? 
Evidence from U.S. Cities, 124 Q.J. ECON. 399, 402 (2009).  
 11 See GARY J. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL 
INCORPORATION 86 (1981).  
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mitigates some of these problems12: People who like the mixed 
urban neighborhoods that were celebrated by Jane Jacobs13 will 
buy or rent in big cities. Those with a yen for open spaces will 
accept the remoteness of exurban communities in exchange for 
very large lot sizes. And large numbers of people who want safe 
and pleasant streets that are separated but not too far from 
commercial districts will gravitate to the in-between suburbs, 
where most of the urban population now resides.14  
Despite the sorting of households by neighborhood 
tastes, a great deal of uncertainty still exists about the 
character of neighborhoods. Even in places where commerce, 
class, and race are statistically mixed, many residents harbor 
anxieties about how the neighborhood may change.15 As a result, 
one would expect to see some additional layers of regulation in 
communities experiencing higher levels of uncertainty and 
pressures for change. Higher uncertainty about neighborhood 
change can be measured across communities at any given time, 
say the year 2013, and it could manifest in changes in existing 
communities over time, say from 1990 to 2006.  
II. ADDITIONAL LAND USE CONTROLS 
The once and future of land use regulation is the 
protective covenant. It preceded zoning regulations and made a 
comeback fifty years after zoning first gathered steam in the 
1920s.16 Covenants were initially elbowed aside by zoning 
because of legal and administrative difficulties and because 
covenants could not practically be applied to larger areas. 
Large-scale developers in southern California found that their 
units were less marketable when lower-quality development 
was parked adjacent to their protected neighborhoods.17 
Developers lobbied both state and (eventually) national officials 
to promote municipal zoning in order to protect their 
investments. On the other side of the coin, large cities such as 
  
 12 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416 (1956); see also Eric J. Heikkila, Are Municipalities Tieboutian Clubs?, 26 
REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 203 (1996).  
 13 JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 220 (1961).  
 14 Peter Mieszkowski & Edwin S. Mills, The Causes of Metropolitan 
Suburbanization, 7 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 135, 135-36 (1993).  
 15 William A. Fischel, Why Are There NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON. 144, 144 (2001).  
 16 ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BOURGEOIS NIGHTMARES: SUBURBIA, 1870–1930, at 
110-11, 114 (2005).  
 17 MARC A. WEISS, THE RISE OF THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS: THE AMERICAN 
REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY AND URBAN LAND PLANNING 21, 62-63 (1987). 
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Los Angeles found that without stable zoning, residential 
development would “move to the nuisance” and pressure city 
officials to displace industry through regulation.18 This process 
threatened the city’s industrial development, resulting in lost 
tax revenue and unemployment. In response, Los Angeles 
developed comprehensive zoning to provide secure and 
separate locations for industry and residences.19 By 1930, 
almost all major cities had implemented zoning that promoted 
stable expectations about future development.20 Covenants had 
largely fallen into disuse, displaced by zoning.21 
The private covenant made a comeback in the 1970s on 
two fronts. The first was its application to multi-unit apartment 
dwellings that were owner-occupied as condominiums.22 Inflation 
in the 1970s begat an increase in local rent-control regulations, 
and developers of new apartment units dealt with this by selling 
their units as owner-occupied housing, which was not subject to 
rent control.23 Nevertheless, the role of the apartment owner and 
his on-site “super” eventually needed to be replaced, and 
developers therefore created the condominium association 
(composed of the units’ owners) in order to manage common 
areas and provide and enforce local regulations.  
The second front came as developers transferred the 
experience of condominium associations to new communities of 
owner-occupied housing units. Although the units were usually 
free standing, developers found that marketing them was more 
profitable if they were endowed with homeowner associations 
and constitution-like rules for governance. The great 
improvement of the homeowner association was that it 
provided for active management of common areas and for 
enforcement of rules. It was also possible for homeowner 
associations to modify their constitutional rules without the 
  
 18 Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 397 (1915); Kathy A. Kolnick, Order 
Before Zoning: Land Use Regulation in Los Angeles, 1880–1915, at 246-47 (May 2008) 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California) (on file with Digital Library).  
 19 Kolnick, supra note 18, at 246-47.  
 20 William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its 
Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 319 (2004). 
 21 Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, 
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 714-19 (1973). 
 22 See, e.g., ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL 
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 51 (1992).  
 23 See, e.g., David P. Sims, Out of Control: What Can We Learn From the End 
of Massachusetts Rent Control?, 61 J. URB. ECON. 129 (2007). 
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unanimity that traditional covenants required, which enabled 
them to respond more efficiently to unforeseen changes.24  
Despite the rise of homeowner associations in the 1970s, 
they did not displace zoning regulations. Indeed, homeowner 
associations often monitor local zoning and send 
representatives to zoning and planning hearings.25 In this role, 
the associations strengthen zoning: they provide belt-and-
suspenders support for new development by supplementing 
zoning. In economic terms, zoning and community associations 
seem to be complements, not substitutes.26  
Older neighborhoods that were developed without 
covenants and homeowner associations had to rely on 
traditional zoning to protect their homes from unforeseen 
events. Indeed, the transaction costs of obtaining the 
agreement of all property owners within most neighborhoods 
would be prohibitive.27 Economists are apt to point out the 
holdout problems that give rise to these costs: if almost all other 
residents agree to restrictions on otherwise permissible 
nonconforming development, the remaining landowners are in a 
position that raises the option value of their property. An 
apartment building surrounded by single-family units might 
generate rental profits greater than one surrounded by other 
apartment buildings. In my experience, however, the 
transactions costs stem less from deliberate holdouts than from 
the difficulty of contacting property owners28: Some may live in a 
different state or country. Some may live in nursing homes. 
Some may disagree on terms with co-owners. And some may find 
it difficult just to understand the nature of the proposed deal.  
In small, relatively homogenous communities, 
homeowners can rely on public zoning to adjust to new 
conditions. Even in smaller towns where neighborhoods differ 
substantially, the multidimensional log rolling of small-town 
life and norms of reciprocity stay the hand of collective 
opportunism.29 For example, although it might benefit the tax 
  
 24 ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 10 (2005). 
 25 Barbara Coyle McCabe, Homeowners Associations as Private Governments: What 
We Know, What We Don’t Know, and Why It Matters, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 535, 537 (2011).  
 26 Rachel Meltzer & Ron Cheung, Homeowners Associations and the Local 
Land Use Regime: Substitutes or Complements?, 46th Annual AREUEA Conference 
Paper (Nov. 29, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract+1717024.  
 27 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, DO GROWTH CONTROLS MATTER? 14 (1990). 
 28 I once explored the possibility of doing this in my neighborhood to forestall 
the conversion of a home to apartments. 
 29 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 182 (1991).  
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base to allow a commercial development in a neighborhood that 
does not want it, the development may not happen because 
other residents typically know at least some of the threatened 
neighborhood residents through local schools, civic organizations, 
and private clubs.30  
A threatened neighborhood in a larger polity is less 
secure for several reasons. Neighborhood residents are less 
likely to know people elsewhere in a larger city or county. 
Development interests are more likely to hold sway in city 
councils and planning commissions.31 And the overall size of 
government makes it less likely that government officials will 
know much about their constituents and vice versa. To counter 
this, cities have some institutions that specifically protect 
neighborhoods. For example, city councils are often elected by 
wards rather than at large, and city service administration and 
planning districts are often divided into distinct regions or 
neighborhoods, whose residents get a special voice in city-
council and planning-board proceedings.32 Nevertheless, the 
literature on the political economy of planning and city 
governance supports the idea that larger cities are more pro-
development than their suburbs.  
III. HISTORIC DISTRICTS 
Historic districts provide one way for a distinct 
neighborhood to establish additional land use regulations that 
are resistant to citywide changes. They became popular in the 
1970s and seem to have been an offshoot of the landmark-
preservation movement, whose poster child was the demolition 
of Penn Station in New York City. In response to that decision, 
the U.S. Supreme Court validated uncompensated preservation 
designations in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York in 1978,33 and most state courts went along with the idea 
that regulations designed to preserve the outer shell of 
buildings constitute legitimate exercises of the police power.34  
  
 30 FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 200-02.  
 31 Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political 
Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. SOC. 309, 320 (1976).  
 32 Mark Schneider & Paul Teske, The Antigrowth Entrepreneur—Challenging 
the Equilibrium of the Growth Machine, 55 J. POL. 720, 732 (1993). 
 33 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).  
 34 See generally Daniel T. Cavarello, From Penn Central to United Artists’ I 
& II: The Rise to Immunity of Historic Preservation Designation from Successful 
Takings Challenges, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 593, 594, 616 (1995). 
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Historic districts—in which entire blocks of buildings 
were subject to preservation and hence made extra-resistant to 
neighborhood change—soon spread and were similarly 
validated by the courts. Owners of individual historic 
landmarks often resisted official designation, however, because 
the additional restrictions occasionally triggered costs that 
exceeded compensatory tax breaks and the benefit of free 
advertising.35 But owners of most buildings in historic districts, 
on the other hand, obtain net benefits from the added security 
against zoning changes, and groups of property owners often 
seek historic designation as a result. Indeed, studies have 
shown that such designation raises their property values as 
compared to undesignated neighborhoods.36  
Historic districts thus emerged as one way to protect a 
neighborhood from the risks of unwanted change while also 
avoiding the prohibitively high transaction costs involved in 
forming a legally binding homeowner association after 
neighborhoods had actually formed.37 But historic districts have 
some drawbacks. One is the requirement that the district actually 
be historic, although this is less of a problem than it might seem. 
For example, buildings do not have to be centuries old. Indeed, 
fifty years will often do—and sometimes even less than that.38 A 
good number of urban neighborhoods can therefore qualify.  
The more serious difficulty with historic districts is that 
they offer excessive protection from change. Residents in some 
localities fear that future modifications of their own property 
may be unduly restricted.39 In these districts, even relatively 
minor alterations, such as the installation of new windows, are 
  
 35 Paul K. Asabere et al., The Adverse Impacts of Local Historic Designation: 
The Case of Small Apartment Buildings in Philadelphia, 8 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 
225, 227 (1994).  
 36 Edward Coulson & Michael L. Lahr, Gracing the Land of Elvis and Beale 
Street: Historic Designation and Property Values in Memphis, 33 REAL EST. ECON. 487, 
488 (2005); Deborah Ann Ford, The Effect of Historic District Designation on Single-
Family Home Prices, 17 AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS’N J. 353, 361 (1989).  
 37 Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697, 
712-16 (2010).  
 38 NORMAN TYLER ET AL., HISTORIC PRESERVATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS 
HISTORY, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE 140 (2d ed. 2009).  
 39 Sarah Schweitzer, Starbucks Proposal Highlights Historic Concerns: 
Demolition Plan Renews Calls for More Protection, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 23, 2007, at 
GNW.1 (“The creation of neighborhood conservation districts is needed, advocates say, 
because towns such as Merrimack, NH have rejected the more stringent form of 
preservation—so-called local historic districts—out of fear that the regulation would 
stifle development.”).  
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subject to the review of a commission.40 Commission members 
are usually drawn from the ranks of preservationists rather 
than one’s fellow neighbors, so they are less likely to be 
sympathetic to the need for an additional bedroom or an 
expanded garage. According to preservationist principles, this 
is as it should be. One rationale for historic districts is that 
individual owners and the local neighborhood may 
underappreciate the building’s historical value.  
Another drawback of historic districts is that 
considerable intellectual controversy surrounds the issue of 
historic preservation of buildings. For example, most buildings 
that were built a century ago, or even fifty years ago, have 
endured considerable modification before being designated 
“historic.” As a result, it is often not clear what period of their 
development is to be preserved.41 And at least some urban 
theorists have questioned the wisdom of any mandatory 
preservation of neighborhoods.42 Indeed, the conventional role 
of cities has usually been as future-oriented engines of change, 
not museums of the past.43 Architects such as Rem Koolhaas 
worry that excessive zeal for preservation might stifle ongoing 
creativity in their profession.44  
IV. NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DISTRICTS 
The gap between consensual neighborhood covenants and 
citywide zoning is, for reasons suggested in the previous section, 
imperfectly filled by historic districts. Partially filling this gap 
are neighborhood conservation districts, which have become 
popular since the early 1980s.45 These districts differ from 
traditional zoning districts, with their SR-2 (single residence) 
and GR-1 (multifamily) designations, in that conservation 
districts provide additional restrictions (and sometimes, 
exceptions) to a geographic area that is not necessarily 
contiguous with zoning boundaries. For example, a neighborhood 
conservation district may consist of several contiguous city 
blocks, some of which are designated SR-2 and others GR-1.  
  
 40 Adam Lovelady, Note, Broadened Notions of Historic Preservation and the 
Role of Neighborhood Conservation Districts, 40 URB. LAW. 147, 148-54 (2008). 
 41 TYLER ET AL., supra note 38, at 18.  
 42 See EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST 
INVENTION MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER 263 (2011). 
 43 Id.  
 44 Nicolai Ouroussoff, An Architect’s Fear that Preservation Distorts, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 24, 2011, at C1. 
 45 Lovelady, supra note 40, at 154.  
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The neighborhood conservation district usually applies 
additional rules for development and modification of homes, but it 
typically does not exempt them from the standards of the zoning 
district where they are located. Thus a home in the SR-2 district 
of the city might be required to have a thirty-foot setback from the 
street line and be no more than thirty-five feet high. Additional 
rules concerning the placement of garages, size of windows, and 
type of roofing could be imposed, which would not be applied to 
homes outside the neighborhood conservation district.  
The districts themselves are usually established as the 
result of neighborhood activism.46 In many cases, the catalyst 
for a neighborhood conservation district is the demolition of an 
existing building and construction of a new structure that is 
consistent with existing zoning laws but is regarded by existing 
residents as inappropriate for the neighborhood.47 The city’s 
planning and zoning department usually does not seek to 
establish subdistricts. Several cities, however, seem to have 
established procedures for setting up neighborhood districts.48 
They usually require that the buildings in the area have 
something in common.49 The common elements do not have to 
be historical: they could be a consistent architectural style, a 
common street layout, or a local community focal point such as 
a park or a school.50 They could also simply be a neighborhood 
that is undergoing some development pressures that residents 
collectively want to resist.51  
In most cases, a neighborhood conservation district is an 
overlay zone, which adds some restrictions to the designated 
area without changing its underlying zoning.52 One example of 
overlay zones is a flood-plain zone, which establishes additional 
restrictions to reduce flood damage.53 Overlay zones do not 
establish independent neighborhood authority over rezoning or 
development proposals but are instead administered by the 
city’s existing zoning and planning apparatus. The very 
  
 46 ELIZABETH DURFEE HENGEN WITH CAROLYN BALDWIN, N.H. DIV. OF 
HISTORICAL RES., NEIGHBORHOOD HERITAGE DISTRICTS: A HANDBOOK FOR NEW 
HAMPSHIRE MUNICIPALITIES 8 (2008), available at http://www.nh.gov/nhdhr/documents/ 
neighbors_hert_handbook.pdf.  
 47 Lovelady, supra note 40, at 180.  
 48 Id. at 156.  
 49 Id. at 154. 
 50 Id. 
 51 HENGEN, supra note 46, at 8. 
 52 Id.  
 53 AMY DAIN, RESIDENTIAL LAND-USE REGULATION IN EASTERN MASSACHUSETTS: 
A STUDY OF 187 COMMUNITIES 18 (2005). 
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existence of the overlay district, however, refocuses the 
attention of citywide administrators and board members 
toward the concerns of neighborhood members, and the usual 
public-notice procedures for such zoning changes and building 
permits ensure that the district’s residents are informed.  
Some neighborhood conservation districts establish an 
additional review of development by a newly created standing 
committee, which is partially comprised of neighborhood 
residents.54 These committees are interesting because they 
resemble the boards of homeowner associations that private 
developers set up to govern common areas in condominiums 
and planned communities. But those private governing bodies 
had to be established without any dissenters among property 
owners. This meant that the initial developer had to own all 
the land at the start. The remarkable aspect of neighborhood 
districts is that they can be established with less than 
unanimity among property owners—sometimes with only a 
majority vote of the city council or its electorate.55  
The powers of the neighborhood conservation district’s 
governing body are typically more modest than those of a 
private community association. One major limitation is that its 
decisions can be appealed to some public authority—typically 
the city’s planning board and the elected city council.56 For 
example, if the neighborhood review committee rejects a 
proposed front-yard garage that otherwise conforms to 
underlying zoning rules, the would-be garage builder can 
appeal that decision to city authorities and potentially to the 
court system. But to do so, one must start with the lowest level 
of regulation and exhaust all remedies before appealing 
further, which would be a time-consuming and expensive task. 
The neighborhood conservation district functions in large part 
like a private community association, albeit having arisen not 
from private property law but from public police power regulation.  
  
 54 See, e.g., HENGEN, supra note 46, at 10.  
 55 See id. (city council or townwide vote); see also CAMBRIDGE HISTORICAL 
COMM’N, NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DISTRICTS IN CAMBRIDGE (Oct. 2002), 
available at http://www2.cambridgema.gov/historic/ncd_brochure.pdf (The city council 
votes after findings of neighborhood committee are presented.); Cambridge Historical 
Comm’n, Historic Districts and Neighborhood Conservation Districts in Cambridge, 
MA, CAMBRIDGEMA.GOV, http://www2.cambridgema.gov/historic/districts.html (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2013).  
 56 HENGEN, supra note 46, at 14; Lovelady, supra note 40, at 157.  
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V. WHY THE DEMAND FOR MORE LOCAL REGULATION?  
The development of neighborhood conservation districts 
parallels several other decentralizing developments in 
municipal governance. In some ways, they resemble the 
business improvement district (BID), where property owners are 
willing to be burdened with additional taxes in exchange for 
additional municipal services.57 As in the neighborhood 
conservation district, the formation of BIDs does not require 
unanimous consent of the neighborhood’s property owners.58 
Another parallel trend is the charter-school movement, which 
establishes self-governing schools within standard city school 
districts, though in that case the local residents do not pay 
additional taxes.59  
All of these approaches—BIDs, charter schools, and 
neighborhood conservation districts—represent subdivisions of 
existing municipal functions. I would characterize them as 
small umbrellas within the city’s larger umbrella, and all of 
them have become especially popular within the last twenty or 
thirty years. The common denominator among these 
approaches is localized dissatisfaction with the citywide 
provision of a local service.60 They are almost always generated 
by bottom-up political activity.61 The citywide government 
seems to accommodate them somewhat grudgingly, and 
scholarly commentary has criticized them for their seeming 
withdrawal from traditional government oversight.62  
One explanation for their rise, then, is the same 
explanation for suburban municipal incorporations in the 
twentieth century that has created the municipal collar—some 
would say noose—that surrounds most large American cities.63 
Homeowners and other property owners demanded different 
levels of public services than those provided in the central city 
  
 57 Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement 
Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 366 (1999).  
 58 Id. at 457.  
 59 James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 
111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2075 (2002). 
 60 One such example is public safety. See Leah Brooks, Volunteering to be 
Taxed: Business Improvement Districts and the Extra-Governmental Provision of Public 
Safety, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 388 (2008).  
 61 HENGEN, supra note 46, at 3.  
 62 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 57, at 457; Paul Teske et al., Local School 
Boards as Authorizers of Charter Schools, in BESIEGED: SCHOOL BOARDS AND THE 
FUTURE OF EDUCATION POLITICS 130 (William G. Howell ed., 2005).  
 63 JON C. TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: THE POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION OF 
METROPOLITAN AMERICA, 1850–1970, at 79 (1979).  
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that sought to annex them. In the early part of the century, 
before zoning became available, municipal independence was 
costly because small suburbs had no way to resist or manage 
the inevitable urban growth. City services—schools, water, 
sewer, fire and police protection—looked attractive if your town 
was going to become a city anyway.64 But after zoning became 
available, many suburbs decided they did not have to become 
so urban, after all. They could remain residential, establish 
their own public schools, and control their own growth.65  
Municipalities and school districts hardly ever subdivide 
after they are formed.66 Thus, residential developments that 
were built within a preexisting municipality had to accept the 
level of services provided by the city, which might be controlled 
by political forces that were not always sympathetic to new 
residents. One interpretation of the neighborhood conservation 
district is that it represents a partial secession from the 
governance of the larger city. And this might be acceptable to 
most elected officials. For example, a working-class city might 
want to prevent its professional-class residents from moving to 
a more affluent municipality, so one way of appeasing them 
would be to provide residents of the upper-class blocks greater 
control over land use within their neighborhood.67 Thereafter, 
the higher-income residents of the more protected 
neighborhood would be less concerned over city officials’ 
inclination to bring in job-creating land uses—that is, uses that 
have some adverse spillovers but are desired by the working-
class majority. The working-class majority would get the fiscal 
benefits of taxes on higher-value properties in the affluent 
neighborhood, and the more affluent residents could enjoy 
living in a diverse community as well as the benefits of an 
urban location instead of a white-bread suburb.68  
A more difficult question is why neighborhood 
conservation districts have become increasingly popular in 
recent years. My theory is that threats to homeowners’ real 
estate values have increased in the past forty years. The threats 
  
 64 Fischel, supra note 20, at 325-26. 
 65 Id. at 322.  
 66 FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 27.  
 67 In City of Bellevue v. East Bellevue Community Council, an upper-income 
unincorporated area agreed to annexation by the city of Bellevue, Washington, on the 
condition that it have veto power over zoning changes by the city. 983 P.2d 602, 604 
(Wash. 1999).  
 68 See Karen A. Danielsen et al., Retracting Suburbia: Smart Growth and the 
Future of Housing, 10 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 513, 518-19 (1999).  
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are partly the result of increases in real estate values in cities, 
which have encouraged developers to press for changes in use 
and for increases in density. The increased values are not 
entirely the product of the late housing bubble. Larger cities 
have also become more attractive because of the steady decline 
in violent and other crime over the past two decades.69 
Homebuyers who would otherwise have fled to the suburbs 
reexamined cities, and as a result, higher-quality, well-
established urban residential districts became more popular.  
The other trend promoting neighborhood conservation 
districts has been the attack on local zoning by higher 
governments and the court system, as well as by changes in 
planning ideology.70 Many of these trends affected suburban 
and small-town municipalities, as well as larger cities, which is 
why even some of the former may have adopted neighborhood 
conservation districts despite the greater responsiveness of 
suburban public officials to their homeowner-constituents. The 
federal government has adopted several rules that override the 
authority of local governments: group homes for the disabled 
cannot be excluded from residential neighborhoods;71 cell-phone 
towers must be accommodated somewhere, not just excluded;72 
and churches must be allowed to expand their operations 
despite local zoning.73  
The courts have also played a role in modifying local 
zoning authority. The Mount Laurel cases in New Jersey 
declared that exclusion of low-income housing must cease and 
that the remedy was to override local zoning that prohibited 
apartments.74 While other state courts have not embraced New 
Jersey’s comprehensive statewide remedy, many have cited 
  
 69 See Amy Ellen Schwartz et al., Has Falling Crime Driven New York City’s 
Real Estate Boom?, 14 J. HOUSING RES. 101, 131-32 (2003). 
 70 These trends are described and discussed in William Fischel, The 
Evolution of Zoning Since the 1980s: The Persistence of Localism, in PROPERTY IN LAND 
AND OTHER RESOURCES 259-87 (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2012).  
 71 See Patricia E. Salkin & John M. Armentano, The Fair Housing Act, 
Zoning, and Affordable Housing, 25 URB. LAW. 893, 893-94 (1993) (discussing the Fair 
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 72 See Steven J. Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, 
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 74 See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 
1975) (Mount Laurel I); S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 
390 (N.J. 1983) (Mount Laurel II); The Hills Dev. Co. v. Twp. of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 
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Mount Laurel approvingly.75 Several state governments, most 
notably Massachusetts, have required local governments to 
rezone for low- and moderate-income housing.76 These cases are 
in part the product of a legal movement to make suburban living 
more accessible to low-income families and people of color.77 
Finally, planners have advocated for changes to local 
zoning practices. The “smart growth” movement that has become 
popular among the planning profession has attacked low-density 
development in the suburbs and urged higher-density infill 
development within established city neighborhoods.78 The 
environmental movement has endorsed higher-density city 
development to reduce carbon emissions from automobiles and 
single-family homes.79 And the exclusion of development from 
rural farmland has pushed at least some homebuilders back into 
cities.80 Economists have urged that local zoning be overridden in 
order to promote higher densities than local zoning allows.81  
All of these trends have put traditional zoning 
techniques under stress. The diversity of neighborhoods in 
larger cities makes homeowners in vulnerable neighborhoods 
nervous about infill development and other pressures for 
change. By building on the historic-preservation model, 
neighborhood activists continue to develop zoning innovations 
that resist these trends or at least modify them to suit local 
circumstances. Like politics, all zoning is local. 
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